Tax Competition, Redistribution, and the European Welfare State

Most countries have seen a sharp decline in corporate tax rates in recent decades. Theory suggests that the mere prospect of losing mobile resources leads governments to undercut tax rates set by other governments. However, not only has the intensity of tax competition been addressed in economic research, but so have its costs. If capital is harder to tax, it is likely that tax revenues will fall, placing a burden on the welfare state. Due to the strong interdependencies between member states, the European Union offers a unique opportunity to study corporate tax competition. The author explores competitive pressure and interactions in European welfare states in the context of increasing financial globalisation. By empirically examining the structural changes in taxation and redistribution, taking into account the diversity of situations present in the European Union, this dissertation offers an up-to-date assessment of tax convergence and tax competition. The research presented therefore sheds new light on the extent and consequences of tax competition.

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